Toward an understanding of genetic information within society: Three essays by Burrows, Jason E.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2000 
Toward an understanding of genetic information within society: 
Three essays 
Jason E. Burrows 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Burrows, Jason E., "Toward an understanding of genetic information within society: Three essays" (2000). 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 6396. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/6396 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 




Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in 
published works and reports.
**Please check "Yes” or "No" and provide signature
Yes, I grant permission _
No, I do not grant permission __
Author's Signature:
Date:
4 p y  copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with 
the author's explicit consent.
8/98
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF GENETIC INFORMATION
WITHIN SOCIETY: THREE ESSAYS
by
Jason E. Burrows 
B.A., Simpson College, 1996 
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
University of Montana 
Spring 2000
Approved by





R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
UMI Number; EP37197
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
uesf
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Burrows, Jason E. M.A., April 2000 Philosophy
Toward an Understanding of Genetic Information Within Society: Three Essays 
Chairperson: Albert Borgmann /V B>
With the rapid advances being made in the field of applied genetics, it is 
imperative that society’s understanding of these developments keep apace. Currently, 
there is no systematic fiamework in which to analyze the relative merits and demerits of 
genetic advances. Rather, work in the social and ethical implications of genetics has 
tended to be piecemeal, ignoring crucial distinctions and relying upon outmoded theories 
of decision-making.
In this portfolio, I attempt to provide the fundaments of a framework for 
understanding the social implications of genetics and to clarify some of the confusions 
that arise as genetics is applied to our social institutions. I focus upon three areas of 
concern. First, using information theory, I distinguish between two types of meaning that 
may be found within genetic information: instrumental meaning and final meaning. Then 
through an analysis of Heidegger’s theory of technology, I illustrate the reliance o f the 
genetic enterprise on technology and how this partnership influences our use of genetics. 
Second, I elucidate two commonly misunderstood sets of concepts in efforts to protect 
genetic privacy: the two distinct prongs of privacy and the two kinds of genetic 
information. Once these misconceptions are clarified, the prongs of privacy are applied 
to the kinds o f genetic information in order to protect more securely the fundamental 
liberties of persons. And finally, I address the thicket of ethical problems that surfaces in 
the context o f genetic prenatal testing, and argue that before we bring traditional moral 
theories to bear upon dilemmas in prenatal decision-making we need to provide more 
substantial definitions of concepts that such decision-making will necessarily employ.
Through this series of papers, I hope to not only provide the fundaments of a 
framework within which a more comprehensive, and thus effective, understanding of the 
developments might develop, but also to give some demonstration of how such a 
ffameworic might be applied in different contexts.
■ 11 -
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Preface
When Francis Crick and James Watson proposed the double helical structure of 
DNA in 1953, it was hard to imagine the predictive power and the effects that their 
discovery would have at the end o f the 20* century. After several decades of basic 
research on the structure of DNA, we are just beginning to realize the plethora of 
practical applications for genetic information. The studfy of genetics has revolutionized 
areas as diverse as medicine, law, agriculture, and environmentalism. Because o f the 
wide range of uses for genetics, we in society are constantly inundated with reports of 
breakthroughs in genetic research and new applications for the principles of genetics.
But in the deluge of updates, relatively little systematic commentary exists by which to 
understand these developments and their impact on traditional societal values. The three 
papers in this thesis portfolio are thus an attempt to provide a framework in which we 
may understand the myriad ways that genetics infuses society. Given the variety of 
societal issues surrounding genetics, these three papers are best understood as conceptual 
ground-clearing rather than an attempt to set out specific directives for action, although 
they do identify certain parameters within which future debate should focus.
Throughout the three papers, I often allude to a problem caused by the large 
number of news reports regarding genetic advances and applications, and thus, would like 
to clarify this problem at the outset. Because of the massive breadth of the genetic 
enterprise, the wide-ranging applications of genetics, and the predictive power of 
genetics, changes are occurring in our societal institutions perhaps faster than our 
understanding can keep pace. Lay readers and even isolated researchers are unable to
- in -
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comprehend the fiill extent to which developments in genetics affect their lives. Lagging 
behind in this conceptual race leaves issues either ignored or inadequately addressed.
To provide some quantitative and qualitative support for the claim that the 
advances of genetics are proceeding faster than our ability to understand them, I have 
researched news articles related to genetics in the New York Times for the past 365 days. 
Within this one year period, 792 articles have been published that directly deal with 
advances in genetics or the application of genetics. * On average, 2.1 articles related to 
genetics appear in the daily New York Times. While the mere frequency is not 
astounding, when the specific content and pathos of these 2.1 articles vary, as they do, 
over the wide spectrum of genetic applications, we are left with mixed messages 
regarding the import o f the “genetic revolution.”
For example, news articles can be positive and elicit hope (“Hint of Success In 
Gene Therapy” Mar. 2,2000), or they can be negative and tragic (“Teenager’s Death 
Shaking Up Field of Human Gene-Therapy Experiments” Jan. 27,2000). They can show 
concern (“Senators Press For Answers On Gene Trials” Feb. 3,2000), or they can 
demonstrate apathy (“Concerns on Human Test Don’t Seem to Faze Biotech Investors” 
Feb. 19,2000). News articles may focus upon political issues (“Study Questions Gene 
Influence on Male Homosexuality” April 23,1999), or they might appeal to 
anthropological interests (“Study Alters Time Line For the Splitting of Human 
Populations” Mar. 16,1999). Applications of genetics can be presented as overtly 
eugenic (“Scientist at Work: Joe Z. Tsien; O f Smart Mice and an Even Smarter Man” 
Sep. 7, 1999), or can be portrayed with a cautionary tone (“Cancer Gene Tests Turn Out
' All information referred to here, including a complete list of news articles for the previous 365 days, can 
be accessed at www.nvtimes.com and doing a keyword search for ‘gene’ in the 365 day archive.
- I V -
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To Be Far From Simple” Aug. 17,1999). And finally, the pathos o f news articles can be 
serious (“PERSONAL HEALTH; Choosing to Test for Cancer’s Genetic Link” Aug. 17, 
1999) or it can be comical (“Scientists Place Jellyfish Genes Into Monkeys” Dec. 23, 
1999).
In combination with the steady frequency of genetic reporting, the diverse 
applications, goals, and opinions of the genetic enterprise can often mislead persons when 
attempting to understand how these developments affect their lives. One popular way of 
understanding modem genetics is to underestimate its particular potency. It might be 
argued that the use of modem genetics in fields like genetic engineering is no different 
than the use o f selective breeding techniques. Humans have been genetically altering 
nature for over 12,000 years through the domestication of both plants and animals. But 
as Reiss and Straughan point out in their book. Improving Nature?: The Science and 
Ethics of Genetic Engineering, traditional biotechnology, i.e. domestication of plants and 
animals, differs from modem genetic engineering in three key aspects: relatedness of 
species, the pace of change, and the number of species implicated. First, while traditional 
biotechnology bred and crossed closely related species, modem genetic engineering 
exchanges genes between two or more widely dissimilar species, i.e. human genes in 
pigs, bacterial genes in plants, or jellyfish genes in monkeys. Second, traditional 
breeding and crossing occurs over the course o f years and generations; changes occur 
within a matter of days or weeks in genetic engineering. And third, traditional 
biotechnology is mostly limited to only those species that provide food or drink, while no 
organism is beyond the reach of modem genetic engineering. (5) Thus, understanding 
the developments of genetics as merely extensions o f past practices is foolish.
-  V -
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However, the impact of genetics upon our lives can also be overestimated.
Reports of “smart genes” or “long-life genes” can usher in a utopian vision for the future 
of humankind devoid of suffering. But these visions overlook the acute suffering and 
sacrificing of persons that would be necessary to achieve such eugenic goals. We must 
therefore avoid either of these extreme interpretations of the impact of genetics, and come 
to a more reasonable understanding of the developments in genetics and the underlying 
values that drive them if we are to employ the benefits o f modem genetics wisely.
In this thesis, I take up three issues in the much larger project of comprehending 
the impact o f genetics on society. The first paper, “Finding Meaning in Genetic 
Information,” addresses two questions that arise as we aw%it the completion of the 
Human Genome Project in 2003. First, what does it mean to know one’s genetic code? 
Drawing upon information theory, I try to demonstrate that the genetic code has no 
meaning outside of a mere causal relation to the development of organisms. Therefore, 
any meaning that is derived from genetic information is originally bestowed upon it by a 
collective agreement among persons. Since DNA lacks meaning in and of itself, we are 
then able to reconsider the meaning that we give to it. The second question that I address 
is why do we assign the meaning that we do to genetic information? An answer to this 
question can be found in Heidegger’s ontology of being in relationship to technology. 
Because our relationship to the genome is always mediated through technology, we have 
a predisposition to assigning meaning to DNA in a certain manner, namely as a resource. 
But this manner of making resources out of technologically mediated things has a 
tendency to extend to the manner in which we receive meaning from things unmediated 
by technology. I thus conclude that we must remain vigilant in our efforts to avoid
- V I -
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confusion between assigning meaning to the genetic code and receiving meaning from 
the persons and organisms that are expressions of a genetic code. Through this paper, I 
hope to establish parameters within which discussions of meaning can proceed, thus 
making available the possibility of directing the usage of genetic information.
The second paper, “Challenges to Genetic Privacy,” takes a more practical look at 
one issue that arises with the availability of genetic information: genetic privacy. As 
genomes are decoded and tests become available for certain genetic traits and diseases, 
the results of these tests render persons vulnerable to unwarranted scrutiny and 
discrimination. I attempt to clarify two sets of concepts that attend this issue and that 
confuse attempts to secure persons from infringements of their basic liberties.
The constitutional right to privacy is a difficult right to employ correctly. Partly, 
this is because it is an unenumerated right, and the argument for its establishment was 
muddled. And partly, confusion arises because there are two distinct protections that fall 
under the right to privacy. I then apply these two protections to another distinction 
between the two kinds of genetic information: the genotype and the phenotype. In this 
process, it becomes apparent that to truly protect persons from the infringement of their 
basic liberties, we need more than legal rules of conduct. Privacy law plays an important 
role in securing persons from genetic discrimination based upon their genomes, but it is 
inadequate to govern the subtle discrimination that occurs based upon phenotype. I thus 
partition off the realm of legal efforts to protecting against genotypic discrimination, and 
relegate the remaining issues to the realm of ethics.
It is within the realm of the ethical that the issues surrounding genetic information 
abound. The third paper, “Limitations of Morality in the Context o f Prenatal Genetic
- vn -
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Testing,” thus attempts to explicate the thicket of ethical problems that attend one, 
relatively specific, application of genetics; prenatal testing. Because of the tangled web 
of ethical problems, we in society should not be too eager to apply traditional moral 
theories to the dilemmas that arise. Following Bernard Williams, I argue that we must 
concentrate upon identifying and delineating the issues involved in prenatal testing. The 
striking result of such an approach is that many of these issues rely upon substantive 
concepts, like “quality of life,” which are currently ill-defined. Only after fully 
understanding the issues involved will we be in a position to make the tough decisions 
that must be made regarding prenatal testing.
Although the three papers are separate and may be read in any order, I have 
arranged them so that certain common ideas might develop through the succession of 
papers. In “Finding Meaning in Genetic Information,” I give a broad, conceptual 
framework in which the other two papers can be understood. “Challenges to Genetic 
Privacy” applies the distinction between technologically mediated and unmediated things 
to the problem of genetic discrimination, yielding a realm of legal protections and a call 
to develop ethical protections. One of the challenges to creating these ethical protections 
is the tension between individual autonomy and the state’s pursuit of the public’s general 
welfare. The legal foundations o f personal autonomy are addressed in “Challenges” 
while the state’s interests receive an interesting twist in “Limitations of Morality in the 
Context of Prenatal Testing.”
Through the distinctions and clarifications presented in these three papers, I hope 
to provide some basic conceptual tools to understand the impact that developments in 
genetics have upon our lives. While I have undoubtedly left important questions
-  V lll  -
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unanswered, I hope to have developed a useful framework in which to address these 
questions, including some illustration of how we might go about resolving them.
I X -
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Finding Meaning in Genetic Information
I. Introduction
An inordinate amount of information is being amassed within genetic research, 
ranging from the isolation of drought-resistant genes in crops to a gene disproportionately 
found in women with breast cancer. However, within the deluge o f news reports and 
research breakthroughs, the genetic enterprise lacks any sustained discussion of what this 
information means. What does it mean to know the gene for X? Or, what information is 
actually being conveyed in the sequences of DNA? It would be helpful to devise a 
method through which meaning is reliably and unequivocally extracted from a set of 
information. But more able persons than I have attempted to provide such a method and 
have been unsuccessful. In this paper, I resign myself to the more humble task of 
determining how we know when we have the wrong meaning of genetic information. I 
investigate the extent to which the meaning that is extracted can influence how we think 
about the referent. Specifically, I will focus upon the area of human genetic information 
and assign the boundaries for extrapolating meaning from our genetic code. My concern 
is the extent to which the information yielded by our genetic code can legitimately affect 
the way in which we think of ourselves in relationship to our origins, our identities, and 
our world, and why we sometimes insist that it will.
II. Defining the Problem
Based upon genetic differences, anthropologists are currently attempting to trace 
the migrations of human populations back in time to their origins. If we follow a reversal 
of the genetic clock, we could reasonably expect to find, in concert with archeological 
data, that the paths of native South and North Americans could be retraced across the
- 1 -
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Bering Strait into Siberia. The paths of the Aborigines of Australia and the South Pacific 
would merge with the Native Americans and Northeast Asians somewhere in Central 
Asia, and converge upon the Middle East as the trails o f the peoples o f Europe sweep 
Southward. Ultimately, it may be found that it is most genetically plausible that the 
ancestral lineage of all humans traces back to one locale in East Africa.*
Within academic circles, the response to this scenario might generally be one of 
detached interest. To academics, the importance of this information is determined by 
their interest in the subject and applicability to their particular field of study. For the 
most part, this information does not disrupt their fundamental understanding of the world. 
There are other sets of data, i.e. the archeological record and linguistic analyses, that have 
sufficiently illustrated this point. Its relevancy to their sense of identity and history has 
already been digested. Within other circles, however, the meaning of the information 
contradicts fundamental beliefs that give meaning and purpose to the lives o f the 
members of those circles. Take for example the Native North Americans, whose oral 
tradition centers their community and provides a link to their heritage. In many of these 
oral traditions, it is said that the Creator placed the tribe upon the earth in their particular 
locale.^ To locate their origin anywhere else would be to take away their connection to 
that locale, and likewise the identity they have formed with their historical and cultural 
surroundings. Because the results of the anthropological study might suggest a different 
origin, many tribes have vowed not to participate in the collection of the DNA samples 
needed to complete this study. Regardless of how one evaluates this situation, the
* See Cavalli-Sforza.
 ̂See James Welch’s Fool’s Crow for a retelling of the Blackfeet’s connection with the land of the Northern 
Rocky Mountain Divide (the Backbone of the World).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
- 3 "
example shows that, at the very least, information has the potential to alter our basic 
understanding of the world.
Through this example, we see two very different ways in which the meaning of 
meaning can be construed. First, there is the way represented by the academic circle’s 
response to the above scenario. I shall call this instrumental meaning. Meaning in this 
sense is useful for obtaining something else. It has relevance in relation to another set of 
information, and thus is useful only toward some other end. The response elicited by the 
academics reflects the fact that its usefulness in garnering other information is redundant. 
Other sets of information have already convincingly demonstrated the conclusion most 
likely to be reached by the genetic anthropologist. The deeper meaning of the study is 
easily digested and flows smoothly into the current worldview of the academics. This 
second type of meaning is what gives purpose to the life of a person. It constitutes a 
necessary part of the identity of an individual. In this deeper sense, meaning is an end in 
itself. I shall call this deeper stnst, final meaning. But the integration of the 
anthropological study upon a person’s worldview does not always flow so easily. It is 
precisely because some Native Americans interpret the projected results of the study as 
contradicting their final meaning that they refuse to participate.
With the help of the distinction between instrumental and final meaning, the focus 
of my paper becomes clear. I am not concerned with the instrumental meaning o f genetic 
information. I am not directly concerned with the uses to which genetic information can 
be applied. In this paper, the questions regarding cloning and choosing the physical 
characteristics of a child are of secondary importance. Although these are interesting 
questions concerning what we can and should do with genetic information, I am mainly
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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conceraed with the extent to which genetic information can impact the conception of 
ourselves as human beings. We will necessarily deal with instrumental meaning, but 
only to shed light upon final meaning, the latter lying deeper than the former. We must 
therefore excavate through the instrumental to understand the boundaries o f final 
meaning. Ultimately, it is from these depths that the questions raised by the application 
o f genetics will ultimately find answers. But let us postpone our concern over these 
matters and focus upon the limits to which final meaning is found within genetic 
information.
III. DNA as Information
If we are going to attempt a foray into the meaning that can and cannot be found 
in our genetic code, we must begin with examinations of DNA, information, and the 
extent to which the genetic code is information. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a 
twisted ladder of molecules. The sides of the ladder are an alternating arrangement of 
phosphates and a sugar called ribose. The rungs are a combination of two nucleotide 
bases, each base branching fi’om its respective single strand of ribose-phosphate complex 
and fusing in the middle. There are four nucleotide bases that make up the rungs o f the 
ladder; adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). Only A ’s bind with T’s 
and vice versa, and only C s bind with G’s and vice versa. Along one side of the twisted 
ladder, any nucleotide base can physically precede or follow any other.
In this thumbnail sketch o f the structure of DNA, we are searching for the way in 
which DNA is information so that the meaning of the information can be understood. So 
within the orderly structure of DNA, we see at least one way in which it can be thought 
o f as information. At its most basic, all information must have some orderly arrangement
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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or stnicture. But the fact that everything with structure is information in some way 
makes the structural sense of DNA a tautology, rendering this conception of DNA as 
information unilluminating. The particular way in which DNA is information cannot be 
discerned by its orderly arrangement.
However, if we connect the orderly arrangement of DNA to ideas in information 
theory, it is tempting to think that this structure could be quantified, thus giving us a 
measure o f the information encoded by the DNA. Perhaps we might get a glimpse of the 
character of DNA in the process of knowing how much information DNA contains. In 
his paper, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Claude Shannon demonstrates 
the relationship between information and probability. He states that in order to maximize 
information, probability must be minimized. Extrapolating from this relation, in order to 
quantify information, one must first quantify improbability. One of the three methods 
that he uncovers is to look at the possibilities of various outcomes. If  we take a randomly 
arranged single strand of DNA, the possibilities available for the first nucleotide base 
observed is four, since there are four possible nucleotide bases. The possible 
combinations for the first and second nucleotide bases are then 16; and for the first, 
second, and third are 64. Each new nucleotide multiplies the previous number of 
possibilities by four, thereby dividing the probability by four. The amount of information 
as measured by improbability thus grows at an exponential rate.
The number of possibilities quickly becomes incomprehensible, especially 
considering the millions of nucleotide bases along a strand of DNA. In order to render 
these quantifications of information manageable, we can use the logarithm to the base 4 
of the possibilities. So for one nucleotide, there are four possibilities: 4 log 4 = 1 ;  with
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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two nucleotides and 16 possibilities, 4 log 16 = 2; and with three nucleotides and 64 
possibilities, 4 log 64 = 3, etc. The resulting numbers ( 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . )  are thus measures of 
information as a representation of the logarithm of possibilities. A strand of DNA can 
then be said to contain as much information as the number of nucleotide bases that 
constitutes its chain.
However, what must be noticed is that these numbers are essentially meaningless. 
The improbability that has been quantified is not a measure o f information qua 
information, but information space. So when we talk about genetic information, we 
should note that this information is devoid of content. Whatever meaning is given to the 
genetic structure derives from how we impart meaning to it. We must therefore move to 
an examination of how content or meaning enters information space.
It should be remembered that meaningful information is not a structured object. 
Generally, meaningful information is a relation between a sign and a person and that sign 
and a thing. There are five component parts that make up this information relation; a 
sign, a thing, a person, intelligence and a context. A person must be present and aware of 
a sign. But the person must also have some background information or intelligence in 
order to connect the sign to the thing that it represents, and this cormection between 
persons and things via signs occurs only within larger contexts of meaning.
Meaning thus presents a particularly thorny problem for understanding 
information. In our quest to find meaning in information, we have been reducing 
information to its constituent parts. But as we do so, we lose the context which is 
essential for grasping meaning. We must therefore shift our focus away fi-om the 
structure o f DNA and to the contexts in which we find DNA.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Opposed to the biological, stnictural sense o f information, we can distinguish a 
cultural sense Of information, in which information instructs our conception of reality. In 
his book. Three Scientists and their Gods. Robert Wright discusses two metaphors by 
which people understand DNA as information. Wright first designates DNA as 
information in much the same way that a blueprint is information. They are both plans 
that direct thé construction Of â niajor architectural project. Just as a realized blueprint is 
a building, so is a realized set of chromosomes an organism (97), Wright also likens 
DNA to information through the analogy o f nucleotide bases (A, C, G, T) of DNA being 
like the letters of the alphabet. During replication, an enzyme unzips the two strands of 
DNA. The exposed sequence Of nucleotide bases are transcribed' into à string Of 
messenger RNA, which, for our purposes, is essentially a template of the original DNA 
sequence. This messenger RNA then travels outside of the nucleus and into the body of 
the cell where it encotmters a cellular organelle. Called a ribosome, and is translated' into 
a protein. In this process, the ribosome attachés to a particular three basé séquencé, 
called a triplet codon, and initiates translation. While attached, the ribosome facilitates 
the joining of an amino acid specifically configured to correspond with this triplet codon. 
The ribosome then moves down the chain to the next three mid facilitates the Joining of 
thé néxt amino acid. This process continués until thé ribosome attachés to a triplet 
designated as a stop codon, and punctuates the new protein chain. To complete the 
analogy, since nucleotide bases are like letters, triplet codons can be thought of as words, 
an amino acid like the meaning of a word, and a protein chain like the meaning o f a 
sentence of triplet ‘words’ (98).
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Looking at molecular genetics in this way is much like tiying to decipher an 
unknown language. We need a translator in order to understand the meaning of the 
‘sentences’ and their constitutive ‘words. ’ The ribosome decodes the genetic triplets, and 
reveals the meaning of the triplet to be a specific amino acid. With this analogy, it thus 
seems that the meaning of DNA lies in the progression o f DNA to RNA to amino acids to 
proteins. Taken further, the proteins go on to build the organism, so the ultimate meaning 
of DNA is the resultant organism. Like in the blueprint analogy, DNA directs the 
construction of the realized DNA, the organism. But a serious problem underlies both 
analogies. To use the word meaning’ in this way is to broaden its definition to the point 
where anything within a causal relation has meaning. DNA is causally related to the 
production of proteins, but a protein is by no means that to which DNA refers.
Something entirely different must be known in order for the genetic code to have 
meaning. Content does not enter into the genetic code just because it has a causal 
connection to the development of an organism.
This point can be supported in connection to our understanding of the information 
relation. With the letters of the alphabet analogy, there is no doubt that there is 
information, as information space, in the processes of transcription and translation, i.e. 
we can calculate the possibilities. However, this alone does not constitute information. 
There must be content that enters into the information space. Information becomes 
meaningful when the aboutness o f some thing is relayed to an intelligent person by a sign 
within a context. We must then identify the parts o f genetic processes that correspond to 
the parts o f the information relation and inquire into the relationship within which the 
meaning of the DNA sequence is the resultant organism.
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If  we take DNA to be a set of signals or signs, we need the intelligence to 
recognize the thing(s) to which they refer. Without this, DNA has no meaning. But 
when we look at the processes of the nucleus, background information tells us that DNA 
is not a sign in any way. It does not represent any state o f affairs within its environment. 
DNA is passive. It has an orderly structure, but it is not an agent of order in any active 
sense. Rather, the environment bumps into the double helix, chemical affinities 
determine which molecules will bind together, and a protein strand is produced. So DNA 
can be neither a sign that refers to something in the environment, nor the thing to which a 
sign refers. Rather, it is a processor of signs. Molecules in the nucleus are the signs that 
bump into the DNA. They deliver messages as to conditions within the nucleus or cell, 
such as low concentration of molecule X, meaning ‘time to replicate. ’ In this way, DNA 
is not so much the subject o f information, but a processor of it (Wright 109-110). At the 
microscopic level, it thus seems that DNA is best suited to play the role of person within 
the information relation. But since we necessarily find meaning within the information 
relation from our perspective, DNA cannot convey the meaningful information that we 
often assume. It therefore seems that DNA can have no meaning for us except within the 
broad notion of being causally connected to the construction of an organism.
So if no meaningful information, neither structural nor cultural, can be expected 
from DNA, why do we place so much importance on cracking its code? Is it to finally 
know which configuration, out of the possible billions, the sequences of adenine, 
guanine, cytosine, and thymine actually take? The Human Genome Project has been 
sequencing the nucleotides of DNA and unlocking the causal relationship between these 
sequences and the organism for over a decade. It is an international cooperative project
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costing billions of dollars and hundreds o f thousands of research hours. What are the 
underlying motives for undertaking such a massive project?
The Human Genome Project is a paradigm example of the implementation of 
modem technology. The research being done is made possible by the advances in 
microscopic technology, and would have been unimaginable prior to this technology. As 
such, an investigation into modem technology will provide some clues as to why we 
pursue a project of such magnitude. Along the way, the elusive question of the meaning 
of genetic information with which we have wrestled will also begin to take shape.
IV. Understanding the Essence of Technology
In “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger explores the essence of 
technology. As he states at the beginning, “the essence of technology is by no means 
anything technological”, it is a way of being and thinking (4). Technology influences the 
way in which we see the world, and thus, how we interact with it. This conception of 
technology is in opposition to the instrumentalist school of thought, which holds that 
technology is simply a morally neutral tool. It is neither good nor bad. The 
instrumentalists define technology as a human activity in which the ends are already 
given, and technology offers the means to achieve those ends.
On a prima facie level, this seems correct. We do use technology in order to 
procure various predetermined ends. However, technology also has typical uses. As we 
put these technologies to typical uses we make basic material decisions as to what kind of 
society we will inhabit. As these decisions manifest themselves in society, individuals 
are prodded into making life decisions that are in concert with the way society is 
organized. For example, our society is organized around the automobile. Because of the
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car, grocery stores are super markets, centrally located within a district they are outside 
of neighborhoods and beyond walking distance. Our jobs almost invariably require a 
commute, and city planning is designed around the flow of the traffic. The effects of the 
automobile have altered the way we think about transportation to the extent that when we 
leave our house, the question ‘By what means am I going to get there?’ never crosses our 
minds Technology is no mere means, but rather an infusion into our way of thinking.
For Heidegger, the instrumental definition of technology is correct, but not true. 
The truth of something makes itself present when its essence is revealed. Wherever 
somediing is used as an instrument to bring about an end, the rules of causality underlie 
this bringing-about. Heidegger refers to the Aristotelian four causes of causa materialise 
formalis,ftnalis, and efficiens as being responsible for something coming into appearance 
or presence. These four causes bring forward an object as something that lies ready 
before us (6). The essence of causality is this setting something forward. It is the 
revealing of the concealed. So when we look into instrumentality as a means, which is 
generally regarded as the mark of technology, we see technology as something deeper, as 
a revealing.
Although all technology is a revealing, modem technology is of a special type. 
Heidegger distinguishes two types of revealing, or bringing-forth into presence. The first 
is a bringing-forth in which the Greeks used the term poiesis. In its highest sense, poiesis 
is “the arising of something from out of itself,” and “has the bursting open belonging to 
bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself’ (10). In a lower 
sen^, poiesis can also refer to the buisting open that is caused by a craftsman or artisan. 
But both senses of revealing as poiesis fail to account for that which occurs in modem
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technology. The harsh coldness of modem technology does not set well with the poetical 
nature of poiesis. Modem technology is a bringing-forth, but unlike poiesis, it is a 
revealing as challenging. It challenges nature to ' supply energy that can be extracted and 
stored as such” (14).
As a challenging, modem technology unlocks the secrets of nature and uses them 
to further the goals of something else. This information is then stockpiled, ready to be 
used at the moment it is called upon. Heidegger gives the example of a power plant set 
into the Rhine River.
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current o f the Rhine.
It sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which 
then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those 
machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric 
current for which the long-distance power station and its 
network of cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In the 
context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the 
orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine 
itself appears as something at our command. The 
hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was 
the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for 
hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the 
power plant. What the river is now, namely, a w^ter power 
supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power 
station. In order that we may even remotely consider the
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monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment 
the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, “The Rhine” as 
dammed up into the power works, and “The Rhine” as 
uttered out of the art work, in Hdlderlin’s hymn by that 
name. But it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the 
landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way 
than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group 
ordered there by the vacation industry. (16)
With the placement of modem technology into the river, the concealed energy of the 
Rhine was exposed, transformed, stored, and distributed in a form unrecognizable to its 
source. The energy o f the river was extracted and set aside as a resource, immediately at 
hand. In like manner, modem technology orders everything to be always ready to be 
used. By tuming an object into a resource, the object no longer presents itself to us; 
rather, it is a subject under our control. The most interesting change that occurs is not the 
transformation of concealed energy to usable energy; it is the alteration in how we view 
the river. The Rhine now refers to something different, namely a power supplier. By 
setting a piece of modem technology into the river, we have changed the meaning of that 
river. Likewise, whenever technology is set upon an object, it orders that object into a 
resource and changes its meaning.
V. Applying Heidegger’s Essence of Technology to Genetic Information
We left our discussion of genetic information with the conclusion that no 
meaningful information can be found within DNA. If we attempt to get meaning out of 
the information space of DNA, we end up not with meaning, but with a causal relation.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
- 14-
DNA facilitates the production of proteins by processing signs (molecules) referring to 
the state of affairs within its cellular environment. As a causal relation, the essence of 
DNA lies in its coming to presence. But in order to be aware o f its presencing, we extend 
the powers of our observation through instruments of modem technology. Because the 
genetic sequencing is only possible within a highly technical enterprise, the revealing 
uncovers not the poetic blooming forth of DNA, but rather, DNA as a resource. The 
genetic enterprise reveals as a challenging-fbrth of the DNA to unlock its secrets, then 
sets them aside to be altered, manipulated, and ready to be at hand when needed. By 
setting technology upon the genome, we thus change our conception of the DNA. It 
becomes not that which processes information into instructions for the cell or that which 
facilitates the blossoming forth o f an organism; rather, DNA becomes material to be 
reengineered and at our command. Even with this being so, it still might be said that 
DNA remains the basis for life. However, following Heidegger’s response to the change 
in character of the Rhine, DNA is only the basis for life insofar as it is an object on call 
for inspection by a research group ordered there by the medical industry. By changing 
the way of revealing through technology, we alter the semantic relationship between 
DNA and ourselves.
The lingering question as to why we pursue the genome project seems to find an 
answer within the technological enterprise. With genetic technology, we are able to bring 
DNA under our control by setting DNA aside as a resource. But the essence of modem 
technology as a challenging revealing explains only half the answer. It explains how 
technology is related to DNA, but it does not fully explain how humans are then related
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to technology. We must establish this relation if we are to complete the link between 
humans and their DNA.
For Heidegger, humans and technology are necessarily linked, but not in a 
common-sensical way. We might think that technology is dependent upon humans to 
invent and create it, but the essence of technology is actually the opposite. Humans are 
dependent upon technology as a fundamental way of being. We are talking about the 
essence of technology, and this essence calls us to set upon nature and challenge forth the 
real as an ordered resource. This essence of technology he calls Enframing, and asserts it 
as a primal disposition of humans. The essence of technology connects to something 
more primitive within human motivation: it sends humans upon a way to order the real as 
a resource. This sending upon a way is what Heidegger calls a destining.
By invoking the idea of destiny, Heidegger leaves us thinking that technology 
determines our course of action, namely ordering reality into a resource. We are left as 
slaves to some mystical notion of fulfilling the will of Enframing. Enframing as the 
essence of technology thus “threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed 
single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free 
essence” (32). We are threatened in two ways. First, as humans go along their way of 
ordering objects into resources, they will increasingly find themselves amidst a world of 
objectlessness. Everywhere humans go, things will seem to be mere artifacts; they will 
experience only their own presence. Ultimately, the disposition to Enframe must then 
turn inward and order humans themselves as resources. Second, Enframing as a 
destining limits humans to only that kind of revealing that is an ordering into a resource. 
Although Enft^ming reveals in one sense, it simultaneously conceals revealing as poiesis.
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In its quest for order, it blocks out the bringing-forth into presence o f an object. As the 
essence o f an object is that which presences, and truth is found when essences are 
brought forth. Enframing thus blocks the coming of truth. When we pursue revealing as 
Enframing, we thereby distract ourselves from the coming to pass of truth (26-27).
We can see both of these dangers within the Human Genome Project, which has 
turned the scientifrc gaze inward to unlock the secrets o f human biology. We are 
sequencing the nucleotide bases of our DNA, and setting aside these ordered packages of 
genes so that we can use them at our discretion. We extract them, store them, recombine 
them, and redistribute them as resources. But in this process of challenging forth the 
DNA, science has occluded the beauty of DNA as it presences itself. We have lost the 
wonder that we first felt when the structure and processes of DNA were discovered. And 
the efficiency of replication, transcription, and translation no longer inspire us. Instead, 
the structure and processes of DNA are things to be manipulated. Any mistakes (and 
even some of the successes) made by the DNA are things to be corrected. The brute 
explanatoiy force of Enframing drowns out the subtle blooming forth of truth.
So is this our fate? Is it to live in a world where objects do not make themselves 
present, but are instead set aside as resources for us? It may be the greatest danger to 
accept that we are determined by technology. But although humans cannot escape the 
primal condition of being sent forth into revealing, this destining is not a compelling 
force for preordained action. Within the realm of destining, we find ourselves truly free. 
We can choose which type of revealing we will embark upon, revealing as a challenging 
forth or as a blooming forth. So although Enframing threatens to lead us away from the
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blossoming of truth, we are not resigned to follow blindly or to struggle helplessly 
against it (25-26).
VI. Finding Meaning in Genetic Information
The relationship between humans and technology thus seems to be one where 
modem technology sends humans on a way of revealing the world in which they live. 
Technology influences the ways in which humans experience the world. As beings in the 
world, we must undertake the revealing of essences. But then this revealing of essences 
is nothing but a search for meaning. According to Heidegger, when we search for the 
essence of something, we are inquiring into its truth, which is how an object presents 
itself to us. We inquire as to the meaning of the object. As part of the equation of truth, a 
subject must experience a coming to presence of the object. Only within this experience 
do objects come to have meaning for us. We must make sense out of the objects of our 
experience, but the question as to how we make sense of our experience remains.
Just as there are two ways of the coming to presence of a thing, as a challenging 
forth and as blossoming forth, so there are two ways in which we make sense of our 
experience. Revealing as challenging into a resource sets aside an object as something 
immediately at hand. It is there to be manipulated upon demand, and used as a means to 
achieve something else. The object as a standing reserve only has relevance in advancing 
some other end, which is only to say that it has instrumental meaning. In using modem 
technology to view humans on a microscopic scale, we predispose ourselves to revealing 
only instrumental meaning. Revealing as a challenging thus limits the extent to which 
meaning can be presented to us, for with instrumental meaning, the semantic energy runs 
only from us to objects. We impart meaning upon things.
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We have seen that at the microscopic level, DNA has no meaning in itself. Once 
a researcher undertakes the investigation of DNA, we give instrumental meaning to it. 
With microscopic technology, the researcher challenges forth the DNA as a resource to 
be manipulated when she deems necessary. But at the same time, this revealing as 
resource clouds the presencing of the DNA itself, by which DNA shows us its true 
essence and illuminates its final meaning.
In contrast to instrumental meaning, whose semantic energy flows from subject to 
object, there is also meaning that flows from object to subject. It is this type of meaning 
that connects subjects to their surroundings, shapes their experiences, and thus shapes 
their identities. Because of this deep connection to our identities and the way we 
experience the world, I call this final meaning. In the blooming forth of things into 
presence before us, things impress meaning upon us. The coming to presence as a 
blooming forth of an object allows us to experience the final meaning of that object.
There is something more poetic and primal to an object than what is revealed by ordering 
it into a resource. When we abandon attempts to order the object, the object will bring to 
our experience the beauty of its presence. The coming into beauty of an object is an end 
in itself, and impresses upon us its final meaning.
So when we experience the world as revealing, humans have a choice as to which 
direction the semantic meaning will flow. If we choose to mediate our experience 
through modem technology, we are predisposing ourselves toward revealing as a 
resource and imparting scientific meaning to things. This is not to say that we cannot 
appreciate the blooming forth of DNA, but it does make it more difficult. It is difficult 
because technology magnifies and amplifies our senses to a different scale. To
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experience the world at this micro scale is to experience a world in which we do not live 
or have background experience. Because we do not know what it is like to experience 
the world at this scale, the blossoming into presence goes largely unrecognized. Instead, 
we attempt to assimilate our perceptions of the foreign scale into an order that we do 
recognize. This altered form of our perceptions then loses its connection to the world in 
which the objects of our perception present themselves. We can only experience a 
microscopic thing by assimilating it to the scale in which we live. Because we extract the 
thing from its scale to ours, we create a void of meaning as it loses connection to its 
microscopic environment. We must therefore impart meaning upon it to fill the void. It 
is this response that develops into our disposition to order technologically mediated 
reality into a resource.
Meaning is therefore dependent upon scale. When we experience the world at the 
scale in which we live, the presencing of objects make sense, without having to order 
them in some way. By experiencing DNA at the microscopic scale, we experience DNA 
as an ordering because it is the only way we can make sense o f it. Therefore, the only 
meaning that DNA can have for us is vdiat I have termed instrumental meaning. It has no 
bearing upon final meaning, as we do not experience DNA in the way we experience the 
world. We experience and have evolved to experience the world of things unmediated by 
modem technology.
So with this understanding of instrumental and final meaning, let us return to the 
practical problem with vriiich I first identified the distinction between the two senses of 
meaning. Should Native American tribes concern themselves with the results of the 
genetic anthropological study? The answer is both yes and no. It remains a danger to
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forget or confuse the difference between instrumental and final meaning. This danger is 
made all the more real, considering humans’ disposition toward confusing the two, when 
our experience is mediated by modem technology. Therefore, Native Americans must 
concern themselves with the practical dangers of confusing instrumental meaning with 
final meaning. However, if Native Americans remember that the meaning of genetic 
information is limited to instrumental meaning, and that they receive fundamental 
meaning from their experiences of the world around them, then genetic information poses 
no threat to cultural or personal identities. Even if  there is overwhelming evidence that 
all groups of humans originated in Eastern Africa, the cultural and personal experiences 
that have developed their identities and connections to a specific locale remain.
As beings that experience the world as revealing, we must consciously work to 
exercise our fi’eedom in deciding when it is appropriate to order the world and when is it 
better to receive the presencing of the world. The challenge that faces not only Native 
Americans, but all humans, is how to practically apply the scientific knowledge that 
orders our world in such a way that the beauty of the world is not concealed, but rather, 
bursts forth. By fostering a world that bursts forth into bloom, we foster our connection 
with the world. Genetic information will never be able to tell us who we are or what we 
should be; these questions can only be answered at the scale in which we live. Genetic 
information is something to which we give meaning. But we must make sure that the 
meaning we impart to it is consonant with the final meaning that gives purpose to our 
lives. Although opinions differ on what exactly constitutes this final meaning, it is clear 
that we cannot find the answers through a microscope. We must focus ourselves upon
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arriving at some consensus regarding who we are before we can wisely decide what to do 
with genetic information.
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Challenges to Securing Genetic Privacy
I. Introduction
Current efforts to protect the genetic privacy of persons have been focused upon 
restricting access to a person’s genome — the full sequence of nucleic acids that prescribe 
certain physical characteristics of individuals. Fears of genetic discrimination are 
justified given past practices by insurers and employers that have denied coverage or 
employment to individuals based upon criteria derived from a person’s genome.
However, in the race to regulate access to genetic information, several confusions have 
arisen which mitigate against the success of anti-discriminatory measures. In this paper, I 
will clarify two crucial distinctions that are implicated in the protection of genetic 
privacy. First, the term ‘genetic information’ is often misconstrued to refer only to the 
genome, which has recently become accessible through new technology. But there 
remains another type of genetic information, the phenotype, which has always been 
accessible to our gaze, and eludes current anti-discrimination efforts. Second, since the 
right to privacy is not an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution, this discovered right 
has also been mistaken to be a monolithic entity. However, as legal scholarship 
demonstrates, there are actually two forms of the right to privacy: one governing the 
access of information and the other guaranteeing certain zones of privacy in which to 
make autonomous decisions. Application of the nuances of privacy law to the richer 
notion o f genetic information thus presents a more complex situation for the protection of 
genetic privacy. By respecting the intricacies of genetic privacy laid out in this paper, we 
shall see that privacy law is limited in its ability to protect persons from all genetic 
discrimination. But these limitations do not call for the abandonment of efforts to protect
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genetic privacy. Rather, they merely signal that we must consign certain areas of genetic 
privacy to ethical rules of conduct as opposed to forcing all protections to be legal. It is 
through an appeal to the ethical underpinnings of privacy that a resolution to genetic 
discrimination may be found.
II. Two Types of Genetic Information
As we interact with one another on a daily basis, we unwittingly have access to 
one type of genetic information. At a glance, we can discern certain genetic 
characteristics of the person who we walk past on the street. Their sex, their skin color, 
their height, and, if  natural, their hair color are all manifestations of that person’s genome 
and readily observable. This type of genetic information has been coined the phenotype 
of a person. The phenotype is the observable expression of genes and it is the form of 
genetic information that is most familiar to us, although often not recognized as having 
genetic implications.
The underlying genetic structure that is expressed as the phenotype is called the 
genotype. The ‘instructions’ for human development are encoded in some 100,000 
genes. The genotype is that specific sequence of nucleic acids that make a particular 
gene, and ultimately, a particular human unique. At the level o f daily social intercourse, 
the genotype is hidden from us, and has historically been unavailable to us.' But with the 
techniques of modem genetics, our genes, and the sequence of nucleic acids that 
constitute them, are no longer necessarily hidden. We are able to uniquely identify 
persons through DNA fingerprinting, as well as identify abnormalities in the genetic
‘in this paper, I will be referring specifically to molecular as opposed to allelic genotypes. While allelic 
genotypes have been known since the 19*** century, our current understanding of molecular genotypes 
provides us with a more detailed access to the underlying genetic structure.
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sequence through testing of tissue samples. It is the advent of our ability to ‘see’ the 
genetic make-up that has sparked the call for genetic privacy.
Following the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003, it is possible 
that the genotype of every gene in the human body could become subject to scrutiny.
The entire sequence of nucleic acids that has been concealed for so long will finally come 
under our gaze. From the front page of the newspaper to the President’s State of the 
Union Address, the promise of this ability has captivated the public’s imagination. 
Underlying the excitement surrounding knowledge o f genotypes is the notion that 
through an understanding of the molecular basis of genes, we can manipulate and control 
the genome to achieve certain prescribed results. Undoubtedly, genetic research and 
technology will provide needed relief to those suffering from severe genetic maladies. 
Medical doctors are already testing gene therapies that will correct diseased genes. But 
these advances in genetic technology and medicine necessarily introduce the availability 
of genotypic information into a society unfamiliar with the power of genetic information. 
Because a person’s genotype becomes available through this new technology, a series of 
legal and moral implications are introduced as well.
Once genotypic information is available, i.e. once the sequence of nucleic acids is 
recorded, access to this information becomes a key question. If knowledge is indeed 
power, then whoever has knowledge o f a person’s genome has a unique power over that 
person. When employers or insurance companies obtain this genotypic information, they 
also obtain power over that individual -  the power to deny coverage or employment. The 
availability of genotypic information should thus be seen as a new possibility to rigidify 
power structures within society and perpetuate certain practices of discrimination and
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oppressioa The reality of this possibility is supported by the history of discrimination 
based upon the other type of genetic information: the phenotype.^
Since phenotypes are the observable expressions of the genotype, it is quite 
possible, and seemingly natural, to make judgments/evaluations of others based upon 
their particular expression of their genes. We tend to shy away from confrontations with 
persons of large stature and assert ourselves when the difference is to our advantage.
Like genotypic information, phenotypic information can be used in wonderful ways. 
Phenotypes provide us with basic information necessary to organize the altos and 
sopranos in a harmonious quartet or to position players on a successful football team. 
However, while these evaluations can be used to celebrate the uniqueness o f individuals, 
phenotypes can also be the basis for the denigration o f persons. Over the course of the 
history of phenotypic evaluations, we, as a society, have favored certain phenotypes over 
others, i.e. male over female, fair skin over dark. These phenotypic differences have then 
been used to justify preferential treatment toward individuals with the favored 
phenotypes. Evaluations of this sort have thus instantiated systems of oppression and 
discrimination, whether they be overt, as in slavery, or covert, as in opportunities 
available to women.
If we are to understand the threat of genetic discrimination, we must understand 
the parallel between genotypic and phenotypic discrimination. While the emergence of 
genotypic information presents challenges for the protection of persons, the challenges 
are not new. Discrimination based upon phenotype is as old as societal interaction. The 
attention given to genetic information qua genotype thus provides an opportunity to
See Kevles for a histoiy of eugenic discrimination in early 20“* century America and Britain.
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coirect old injustices based on phenotype as well as to address the challenges peculiar to
genotypic information.
in. The Right to Privacy
One o f the key tenets of liberal democracies like the United States is the 
(protection of persons from unwarranted intrusions into their private lives. If we are to 
understand how the right to privacy can act to protect persons with respect to their 
genetic information, we must delineate the two distinct strands of privacy. Through a 
historical analysis of the ‘discovery’ o f the right to privacy, I hope to illustrate how the 
two strands o f privacy can act to mitigate the use of genetic information in restricting the 
fundamental freedoms of persons.
As a matter of general legal interpretation, there are two types of rights in the U.S. 
Constitution. Enumerated rights are those explicitly stated in the Amendments of the 
Constitution, i.e. t te  rights to a free press, free speech, and the free exercise o f  religion. 
Although these rights still require judicial interpretation as to their particular meaning and 
bearing within certain contexts, their status as strong rights is uncontested. The right to 
privacy is not such a right; it is an unenumerated right discovered in the Constitution.
The very existence of this right is a matter of judicial interpretation. But over a series of 
Supreme Court decisions, the right to privacy now enjoys a secure place among our 
fundamental rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in 1965 with the 
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. At issue in this case was the state’s ability to 
infringe upon the liberties of persons under the substantive due process clause of the 
Amendment. Connecticut had passed a state statute that criminalized the use of
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contraceptives. In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the term ‘liberty’ in 
the due process clause should be interpreted as meaning the fundamental liberties of 
persons, and followed that the right to privacy is one such liberty. In support of this right, 
Douglas appealed to the “penumbras” of several of the enumerated rights, suggesting that 
the right to privacy is the underlying foundation for our set of enumerated Constitutional 
protections. This discovered right to privacy, in combination with the 14* Amendment, 
was then used to strike down the Connecticut statute.
In arguing for the right to privacy as a fundamental liberty. Justice Douglas 
pursued two lines of reasoning, ostensibly meant to establish the same right. However, 
each line of argument has come to be understood as a distinct prong of the right to 
privacy. Justice Douglas first argued that if persons are to be able to exercise their 
fundamental liberties, there must be certain “zones of privacy” in which persons are free 
from state intrusion. Within this private sphere, persons are free to make the decisions 
that will affect their lives. Douglas’ first argument has come to be understood as 
establishing our right to make autonomous decisions.
In his second line of reasoning, Douglas appeals to the decision in NAACP v. 
Alabama, which ruled that the state of Alabama could not require the state chapter of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons to disclose its membership 
lists. Requiring the disclosure o f these lists violated the members’ right to free 
association, and hidden within this right was a protection of the privacy of those 
individuals. But the privacy being protected was not the privacy to make autonomous 
decisions for which he had earlier argued. Instead, there seemed to be an implicit 
understanding that in publicizing the membership lists, the state was subjecting the
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members to unwarranted, and perhaps hostile, scrutiny by the public given the social 
climate of Alabama in the late 1950’s. In order to protect persons from the hostile gaze 
of the public, Douglas argued that the Court must protect the information used to subject 
persons to scrutiny. The unwarranted disclosure of personal information was thus a 
violation of the right to privacy; it was the right of persons to decide who has access to 
one s personal information. Although it seems clear that Justice Douglas intended that 
his second argument support his first, we now understand his reasoning to establish a 
distinct right to privacy: the right to informational privacy.
The foundations of the two prongs o f privacy, autonomy and informational, were 
thus established in the Supreme Court decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, but because 
of Douglas’ muddled arguments, the right to privacy remained an ill-defined concept. It 
was only through a series of later cases that the right to privacy was refined into its 
distinct strands. I will follow the evolution of each strand separately, noting its 
developments and presenting the current understanding of both prongs so that the 
application to genetic privacy will follow naturally.
Douglas’ argument establishing “zones of privacy” and protecting the right to 
make autonomous decisions was, for the most part, unambiguous. Therefore, the 
development of this right has less to do with clarifying and refining the constitutional 
guarantee of autonomy than o f determining the limits of its protections. The extent to 
which the state can pursue the general welfare against the fundamental liberties of 
persons is a common theme within constitutional democracies. In the case of autonomy, 
the Supreme Court has had to weigh a person’s right to make decisions without the 
intrusion o f state regulation against the state’s legitimate role of protecting persons from
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harm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this debate has been focused upon the right o f autonomy 
in medical decision-making.
One of the most famous attempts by the Court to define the limits of the 
autonomy prong of privacy came with the decision in Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept, o f  
Health. In the early 1980’s, a young woman, Nancy Cruzan, was in a car accident. 
Paramedics resuscitated her, but the lack of oxygen left her in a coma. Despite appeals 
by parents and friends that Nancy would wish to be taken off of nutrition and hydration 
support, the Missouri Department of Health would not withdraw the feeding tubes. After 
8 years of legal appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Cruzan family and 
mandated that the equipment be withdrawn. Through its decision, the Court strengthened 
the right of privacy qua autonomy finding that the individual’s right to refuse medical 
treatment trumped the state’s duty to provide for the health of its citizens.
The autonomy of persons would receive its most explicit formulation in 
Washington v. Glucksberg. In this case, the underlying issue was physician-assisted 
suicide, a matter that perfectly illustrates the conflict between individual autonomy and 
the state’s role of protecting persons from harm. The State of Washington çnacted 
legislation that made it illegal to assist in another person’s suicide. In response to this 
statute, a group of physicians who regularly treat terminally ill patients sued the State, 
claiming that they would violate the law if asked by their patients and the severity of the 
situation called for such a humanitarian act. In her concurring opinion. Justice O’ Connor 
clarified the right of privacy qua autonomy as “the individual’s right to make certain 
unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny”, and 
protects those matters “central to personal dignity ” (Glucksberg 2307). But ultimately.
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the Court found in favor of the State o f Washington, that the statute outlawing physician- 
assisted suicide was within its 14* Amendment powers. The Court argued that the right 
o f autonomy can be limited if the state had a "compelling state interest,” and thus, 
physician-assisted suicide was not protected by the right to privacy given the state’s 
compelling interest in guarding against the involuntary hastening of death.
Interestingly, just as the refinement of the right to privacy qua autonomy evolved 
through a string of medically related cases, so can the development of informational 
[Hivacy be traced through issues surrounding medicine. In 1977, the Supreme Court 
revisited the question of the disclosure of personal information with the case Whalen v. 
Roe. The State o f New York passed a statute requiring that the dispensing of potentially 
harmful drugs be registered with the State Health Department in order to prevent creating 
a market for these drugs through over-prescription, multiple fillings, and obtaining 
prescriptions from multiple doctors. Patients who regularly received these drugs and 
doctors who regularly prescribed than contested the constitutionality of the statute as 
invading the “zones of privacy” protected by the right to privacy qua autonomy. They 
did not specifically argue for the right to informational privacy. The confusion that 
attended the argument of the appellees in Whalen v. Roe is thus a prime example o f die 
need to separate the prongs of privacy, and explicate their respective domains.
Justification for the right to informational privacy, or selective disclosure of 
infonnation, is found in the need to have certain aspects o f our lives ftee from the public 
gaze. Although this may entail demarcating certain “zones” that are strictly private, what 
is essential to these zones, i.e. what these zones are meant to protect, is the personal
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infonnation that may be used by the public to limit our other liberties. The control of 
personal information is thus essential in order to protect our basic liberties.
So when the physicians and patients contested the New York statute, they were 
essentially concerned with the restriction of other basic liberties that would attend the 
mandatory disclosure of this information. The appellees legitimately argued that the 
statute required the release of private medical information that could potentially subject 
both physicians and patients to public scrutiny. Concern for their reputations might have 
disposed some patients to refuse beneficial medications and may have rendered doctors 
reluctant to prescribe drugs that fall under the criteria of the statute. However, the 
argument brought to the Court (and eventually accepted by the Court) was that the New 
York statute was an infringement o f autonomy, not of the selective disclosure o f private 
information. The confusion within this argument is illuminated by the fact that the State 
of New York was not making important decisions for the physicians and patients, as was 
evident in the case of physician-assisted suicide. The State only required the individuals 
to register their decisions with a state agency. Instead of appealing to the right of 
autonomy, the appellee’s argument provided support for the security of personal 
information and the r i ^ t  to engage in activities free from the judgment of others. To 
understand the New York statute as a breach o f autonomy was to stretch the meaning of 
autonomy to the general idea of liberty, and thus, to lose its usefulness in making 
distinctions within our rights o f privacy (Huff 793).
Whether or not a clarirication of the two prongs o f privacy would have had a 
bearing on the outcome of the case is a matter of debate. But it seems likely that a more 
explicit appeal to informational privacy would not have been enough to sway the Court in
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favor o f the appellees. The Court ruled that the statute requiring the registration of 
certain drugs with a state health agency was a reasonable exercise in maintaining public 
health, and that this interest superceded the right of patients and physicians to avoid 
“disclosure of personal matters” {Whalen 599).
However, the right to informational privacy received a crucial refinement by the 
Second Circuit of Appeals in Doe v. City o f New York. The issue facing the Court of 
Appeals was the degree to wiiich certain forms of medical information were strictly 
personal. In this case. Doe had filed a discrimination claim based upon his 
homosexuality and positive HIV status to the City of New York Commission on Human 
Rights. The commission later released information regarding Doe’s HTV status to the 
press, subjecting him to the possibility o f discrimination by his employer, co-workers, 
and insurance company. Although the state had a legitimate interest in accessing this 
information, given the infectious nature of the disease, the Court of Appeals found that 
the state should not have had access to this medical information. Because o f the uniquely 
personal nature o f the information, the individual’s right not to be scrutinized trumped the 
state’s public health interest calling for the disclosure o f the information. The key factor 
that allowed the selective disclosure o f information to override the state’s health interest 
was thus the uniquely personal nature o f the medical information.
These court cases reveal the two distinct strands o f privacy that protect two 
distinct domains of privacy. The right to privacy qua autonomy guarantees our right to 
make the fundamental decisions that affect our lives and dignity, especially in the most 
intimate spheres of our lives. On the other hand, the right to informational privacy 
protects us from unwarranted observation, and therefore, evaluation by others. In
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combination, these two domains of privacy act to secure the fundamental liberties of 
persons, so that we are able to pursue our interests without the undue interference of 
others. But this analysis of the right to privacy has also elucidated another issue that is 
pertinent to the application of privacy to the concerns surrounding genetic information.
In the discussion of both strands of privacy, the interests of the state offer certain 
limitations to the protection of privacy. As we consider the right to genetic privacy, we 
must keep in mind the lessons learned in the analysis of privacy. A person’s right to 
privacy is not absolute; compelling state interests can restrict it. The interesting questions 
are thus when and how.
IV. The Right to Genetic Privacy
The application o f the right to privacy to genetic information can be divided into 
two main concerns, roughly corresponding to the two prongs of privacy. First, the 
availability of genetic information immediately exposes uniquely personal information 
about persons to the evaluation o f others. Second, the state has a demonstrated interest in 
public health, militating against the individual’s right to make decisions based upon their 
genetic infonnation. In this section, I will consider these two issues separately, outlining 
the various issues that arise, and will conclude, in the final section, with suggestions as to 
how to interpret the confluence o f the two prongs of privacy with the two types of genetic 
information.
Genetic Informational Privacv
As the decision in Doe v. City o f New York demonstrates, in order for medical 
information to be protected under the right to privacy, it must be of a uniquely personal 
nature, i.e. the release of such material must directly threaten to limit a person’s
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fundamental liberties. Likewise, if genetic information is to be protected, we should be 
able to show how genetic information is uniquely personal, and thus how any 
unwarranted release of genetic information renders persons exposed to scrutiny by the 
public. There are three ways in which genetic information is uniquely personal. First, a 
person’s genome can predict an individual’s likely medical future for a variety of 
conditions. This ability to predict likely medical problems has likened the genome to a 
“future diary,” a concept that we will explore shortly. Second, genetic information 
implicates the genetic status of persons other than the individual to which the information 
directly refers, namely biological parents, siblings, and children. Released information 
can thus subject uninvolved persons to public scrutiny and a limitation of their rights.
And third, genetic information has historically been used to stigmatize and victimize 
persons (Annas 360). Expounding upon each one of these reasons separately, I hope to 
demonstrate that without a doubt, genetic information is uniquely personal information, 
and thus, requires protection under the informational strand of privacy.
The enterprise of medical research occupies itself with establishing the causation 
of disease. Once the causal link is identified, treatments, therapies, and behaviors can 
then be modified to eliminate, mitigate, or avoid the causes o f disease. However, genetic 
diseases currently present quite a conundrum to the enterprise of medicine. Researchers 
are often able to identify the diseased, or abnormal, gene that causes the particular 
disease, but too often this diagnosis produces little that can be used to treat the disease.^ 
The affected individual thus is aware of a scenario that will likely play itself out in the
 ̂There are many efforts that are now using genetic techniques to rid persons of ‘bad genes,’ and some of 
these efforts have had celebrated success, even more showing promise. But it still remains that there are 
more identifiable genetic diseases than curable genetic diseases.
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fiiture, but may be paralyzed from doing anything to alter its probability, time of onset, or 
severity. For this reason, information about one’s genome has been called oiœ’s “future 
diary” (Annas 360).
Consider the example of Huntington’s Disease, a harrowing affliction striking 
most often during one’s 40’s or 50’s. Once popularly known as Huntington’s Chorea 
because of the wild involuntary movements associated with the disease, this genetic 
disease leads to a slow deterioration of mental abilities, i.e. intelligence, emotional 
control, balance and speech. Since the Huntington’s gene is a single dominant gene, 
children of an affected parent have a 50% chance of also expressing the disease. With 
the availability o f a genetic test to ictentify the presence o f this gene, children can know, 
with h i ^  probability, whether or not they will suffer the same fate as their parent. If the 
test returns positive, the scenario of deterioration that crippled the life of their mother or 
father morbidly awaits the child. Although treatment in this area is progressing, there is 
little, if  anything, that such a person can do to alter the course of the disease, yet they 
must anxiously live the next twenty or so years before any symptoms begin to appear.
The uniquely personal nature o f genetic information can be illustrated through the 
concerns o f a diagnosed individual. Knowledge of one’s diseased genetic status can cut 
deep into the self-perception of persons. Akin to the sense of moral powerlessness felt by 
the ancient Greeks in the face of Moira, or Fate, persons are often powerless to alter the 
course of their disease, leaving them grasping to understand their situation. They may 
come to wonder if they somehow deserve such a disease, that they are somehow less 
worthy of a full life. Beyond such anxious thoughts, affected persons must contemplate 
how the disease will affect their life plans. And to aggravate the sheer gravity o f coping
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with such news, they must worry about how they will be received by society, if they will 
be subject to discrimination, and whether the liberties they have so enjoyed might be 
limited given this new knowledge. If the information were to reach their insurance 
companies, what kind of coverage would be available to them, and at what price? And if 
their employers were to obtain this information, what future do they have in their careers? 
Such possible restrictions on a person’s liberties necessitate understanding genetic 
information as a highly personal form of information, and thus clamor for protection 
under the right to informational privacy.
The second reason that genetic information is uniquely personal has already been 
intimated in the discussion of the first reason Because genes are hereditary, certain 
anomalies in one’s genome imply a probability that the same anomaly will be present in 
the genomes of biological relatives. The aforementioned concerns that arise for those 
persons directly affected, both existential and practical, also affect family members. 
Although the right to informational privacy can do nothing to protect persons and their 
families from the reality of the disease, it can do much to protect them from the 
possibility of scrutiny and discrimination based upon the disease.
One concern that separates the position of the positively diagnosed from the 
position of family members is the knowledge that one will express the particular genetic 
disease. Whereas diagnosed persons already know their status and must begin coping 
with their situations, the confirmed status of family members is unknown, necessitating a 
different kind of coping. Especially in cases where no cure currently exists, the 
knowledge of one’s probability of expressing a genetic disease, yet not knowing for sure 
if  one’s future has a diseased script, is undoubtedly a daunting state o f existence. Does
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one take a genetic test to confirm or eliminate the probability? Or is it better to live one’s 
life ignorant of one’s future health? (This unique position of family members raises 
further issues regarding the right to privacy, such as the right not to know one’s status vs. 
a duty to know, but this discussion will be better served within the context of autonomy, 
which we shall explore shortly.)
But before we consider the prong of privacy qua autonomy, let us first address the 
final reason that genetic information is o f a highly personal nature: genetic information 
has historically been used to stigmatize and victimize individuals. In a famous 1927 
Supreme Court case. Buck v. Bell, the enforced sterilization of persons thought to carry 
‘bad genes’ was ruled constitutional. A young woman, Carrie Buck, herself bom o f a 
mentally deficient mother, gave birth to a daughter while institutionalized at the Virginia 
Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded. The ruling of the Supreme Court permitted the 
state to pursue their eugenic program in the name of public health, ending with the state- 
sanctioned sterilization of Ms. Buck. In his opinion. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
uttered the famous eugenic words, “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough” {Buck 
201-202). Tragically, the daughter of Carrie Buck later showed signs of being especially 
bright before her death from an intestinal disorder in the second grade (Kevles 112).
Institutional discrimination such as that illustrated in the case o f Buck v. Bell has 
largely been eliminated since the heyday of the social eugenics movement in the first 
thirty-five years of the 20* century. However, discrimination based upon genetic 
information continues to threaten persons in two ways. First, as I have alluded to above, 
employers and insurance companies have large incentives to deny employment or 
coverage to individuals known to carry a genetic disease. Training employees costs
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companies large amounts of time and money. If persons known to be turnover risks can 
be weeded out in the hiring process, the company can maintain a more efficient 
workforce, saving dollars in the long term. Likewise, if  insurance companies can identify 
current or prospective clients as high risks, they too can financially benefit from genetic 
information. Depending on the severity o f the genetic disease, premiums could be 
adjusted to account for expected medical care, or coverage could be denied altogether. 
Either way, those individuals who most need the protection will either be without 
insurance or forced to pay incredible premiums to receive coverage. The threat of 
discrimination against those carrying abnormal genes will only be exasperated by current 
trends in the insurance industry, which are steadily shifting from a community rating 
system to a system based upon individual risk and experience, without making the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks (W olf347).
The other area in which discrimination threatens the freedoms of persons is in the 
area of reproductive rights. As the case o f Buck v. Bell demonstrates, the right to bear 
children can be withdrawn if genes deemed unworthy are likely to be passed on. But 
Buck V . Bell is not merely an antiquated court case, remaining only as an aberration in the 
history of jurisprudence. Twenty-four states still have sterilization laws in effect, albeit 
highly regulated (Kevles 111). That such laws exist attests to the threat against personal 
liberties created by the institutional bias against persons with genetic maladies. Given the 
degree to which this discrimination has limited the freedoms of persons, the highly 
personal nature of genetic information must be asserted to protect persons from harmful 
uses of their genetic information.
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The successful application of the right of informational privacy to genetic 
information hinges upon its uniquely personal nature. As the case of Doe v. City of New 
York suggests, in order for genetic information to be secure against the state's interest in 
pursuing public health, there must be a demonstrable threat to the restriction of a person’s 
fundamental liberties. In fleshing out three reasons why genetic information is of such a 
uniquely personal nature and why unregulated access to it poses such a threat to liberty, I 
hope to have secured the information of one’s genome under the guaranteed right to 
informational privacy. We can now turn to the issues surrounding the application of 
privacy qua autonomy to genetic information.
Issues of Autonomv in Decisions Regarding Genetic Information
T hrou^ our discussion of court cases, we have refined the right to privacy qua 
autonomy as protecting those important decisions that will affect our, or our family’s, life 
plans. But as we have noted, this right is not absolute and can be limited by compelling 
state interests. The interesting questions that surround the application of privacy qua 
autonomy to issues involving genetic information thus arise at the intersection of the 
state’s compelling interests and the individual’s right to make autonomous decisions. In 
this subsection, I will explicate the opposing interests in issues of personal autonomy in 
order to provide a framework by which to understand and engage in the numerous 
debates that attend the issue of personal autonomy in decisions regarding genetic 
information.
Public health, including the health of future persons, is the most often cited state 
interest that challenges individual autonomy. If  we are to understand how personal 
autonomy can be limited by the interests of public health, we must first grasp the basic
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nature of genetic diseases. Because all genetic diseases display some pattern of 
inheritance, it is, in principle, possible to eradicate them through manipulation of 
reproductive behavior. It would then be consistent with the state’s interest to pursue 
programs which aim to bring about this elimination of disease. But a key component of 
any program that attempts to eliminate genetic disease through manipulation of patterns 
of inheritance must alter reproductive habits. One method of covertly achieving this end 
is through a “duty to know” (Laurie 91-93). It is argued that if persons know the high 
probability of passing on a genetic disease to their children, they will readily alter their 
reproductive behavior. The state thus achieves the change in behavior necessary to break 
the patterns of inheritance through the decisions o f individual persons.
However, several difficulties challenge the establishment of any duty to know. 
First, there are practical objections to the effectiveness of this duty. Knowledge of one’s 
genetic status does not guarantee that persons will in fact alter their reproductive behavior 
(Laurie 92). Second, certain constitutional questions might be raised, i.e. personal or 
religious beliefs may keep persons from taking birth control, having a selective abortion, 
or even accepting the goal of the public health program. And as Roe v. Wade 
demonstrates, there is good reason to believe that the limiting of an existing person’s 
rights does not supercede the rights o f future persons to good health (Laurie 93). Third, 
we must ask whether the very establishment of a duty to know infringes upon the rights 
of persons. In direct opposition to the duty to know, there exists a good argument for the 
establishment of a right not to know one’s genetic status. Whereas the duty to know 
finds its justification in the state’s interest to secure the general health of its citizens, the 
right not to know is grounded in the interests o f individuals, expressed specifically in the
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right to privacy qua autonomy of persons. If a right not to know can be legitimated under 
the right to privacy, then a duty to know is unacceptable.
Let us thus turn to the interests o f persons with regard to genetic information to 
provide a check against the public health interests of the state. In the earlier discussion of 
informational privacy, I referred to the unique position of the family members of persons 
carrying diseased genes. As opposed to their relative who is already known to have a 
hereditary genetic disease, family members have a choice whether or not they wish to 
know their own genetic status. Given the psychological and social burdens that 
accompany such knowledge, it is reasonable to accept that implicated family members 
may wish not to know. Such a desire to remain in ignorance is all the more reasonable 
considering that often no cure or preventative treatment is available.
The issue here is not whether the implicated individual should want to know or 
not want to know; the issue is that it is not the state’s responsibility to decide this for the 
individual. To reiterate Justice O’ Coimor’s words in Glucksberg v. Washington, “it is 
the individuai's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his 
own, or his family’s, destiny” [emphasis added] {Glucksberg 2307). We have already 
demonstrated the importance of this decision as well as the extent to which the decision 
will affect one’s coping with their genetic destiny. The right to make this autonomous 
decision must remain with the individual. Relatives o f a person known to carry an 
inherited genetic disease might unavoidably know in the abstract that there is a possibility 
of their expressing the same disease, but they can choose not to know in the concrete 
(Laurie 91). Since this right not to know finds protection under the right to privacy qua
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autonomy, public health initiatives attempting to establish a duty to know must be 
avoided.
Both prongs of privacy thus provide strong protection for the fundamental 
liberties o f persons in genetic contexts. We have seen that informational privacy secures 
persons from the unwarranted gaze of the public, which can subject them to 
discrimination and exploitation based upon their genomes. And we know that the right to 
privacy qua autonomy ensures that persons are free to mzdce decisions involving their 
genomes. However, there are limits to which the concept of genetic privacy can protect 
persons. Legal protections have focused upon securing genotypic information, i.e. 
regulating the collection of samples and information in gene banks, while phenotypic 
information has been left unprotected. If we are to take seriously the protection of 
persons with regard to their genetic informaticm, we must consider how privacy interacts 
with phenotypic information. We might find that it is not privacy law, but rather the 
spirit of privacy that acts to protect persons.
V. Understanding the Various Arrangements of Genetic Privacy
I have intentionally refrained from incorporating the distinction between 
genotypic and phenotypic information into our discussion of genetic privacy in order to 
avoid confusion in the previous sections. Simplifying the discussion in this way enabled 
us to consider the nuances of privacy without the complicating factor of the dichotomous 
nature of genetic information. But in order to proceed in this manner, it was necessary to 
rely heavily on one conception of genetic information. As may be seen in my analysis of 
genetic privacy, I have invoked the genotypic notion of genetic information to illustrate 
the problems and issues that arise. I have used the genotypic conception as the default
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understanding largely because it more closely matches our intuitive definition o f genetic 
information, and because current legislative efforts tend to only focus upon protecting the 
information gleaned firom the genotype. But now that we have laid out the application of 
the two prongs of privacy to genetic information, we can recast our conclusions in light 
of this a&nission, and then consider the role o f privacy in discussions of phenotype.
As we have seen, information that is directly derivable from a person’s genome 
can be brought under the protection of the right to privacy in two ways. Genotypic 
autonomy concerns itself with decisions regarding the manipulation o f one’s genome. 
Areas in which genotypic autonomy might be exercised include the acceptance or 
rejection of gene tlwrapy to correct a genetic malady, the desire to pursue cosmetic gene 
therapy to enhance certain genetic traits, and finally in reproductive issues such as 
selective abortions based upon disease, traits, or even sex. It is the prima facie right o f 
persons to make decisions in these areas. As such, the issues that arise in genotypic 
contexts parallel those issues in traditional medicine; any infringement upon the right of 
genotypic autonomy must demonstrate a compelling state interest.
We also see a parallel between selective disclosure of genotypic information and 
disclosure of other kinds o f medicM information in that both are concerned with access to 
the information. But as I have argued, genotypic information is of a much more intimate 
nature, and thus exposes persons to a particularly harmful form of discrimination. For 
this reason, genotypic information requires special recognition and protection under the 
right to selective disclosure of information Attempts have been made to regulate access 
to genotypic information, as well as to legislate rules for the cdlection and storage o f
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saraples from which the information is derived/* Bills such as the Genetic Privacy Act 
provide a necessary protection against unwarranted access to genotypic information, and 
thus, secure persons from discriminatory actions based upon their genomes.
However, critics o f efforts to pass anti-discrimination legislation argue that 
subsuming genotypic information under the right to privacy does not go far enough in 
protecting persons. Susan Wolf argues that the most serious harm to persons resulting 
from access to genotypic information is not discrimination per se, but the identifying of 
persons as their genes (346). The anti-discrimination approach assumes that genetic 
discrimination is deliberate, ignoring the deeper psychological dimensions like the 
stereotypes and prejudices that precede and fuel the drive to discriminate (345). If we are 
truly to protect persons from infringements o f their basic liberties, we must also focus 
upon treating persons as persons, not as their genes. We need to expand our efforts 
beyond protections for genotypic information to include the roots of discrimination that 
are found in our daily interactions. We must apply the right of privacy to phenotypic 
information.
Phenotypic information poses a particular problem for privacy law. Since 
phenotypes are the observable expressions of the underlying genetic constitution, certain 
bits of information are unavoidably exposed to public scrutiny as soon as one enters the 
public sphere. Control of one’s phenotypic information is thus extremely difficult. 
However, phenotypic information can be exploited just as easily as genotypic 
information. A genetic disease such as Huntington’s disease or Down syndrome 
manifests itself in characteristic ways such that an observer need not have any direct
* See Annas for a foil description of the considerations involved in drafting the Genetic Privacy Act.
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access to genotypic information in order to confirm one’s genetic status. For example, 
insurance companies could raise premiums on account of the documentation that your 
father suffers from Huntington’s disease.
Wolf is correct in stating that we must address these problems, but she is a bit 
hasty in dismissing the value of privacy in curtailing genotypic discrimination. What is 
necessary is a clear picture of the differing ways in which the concept of privacy can 
assist in protecting persons. When applied to genotypic information, the right to selective 
disclosure of information legally secures persons against discrimination based upon their 
genomes. In the case of phenotypic information, legal regulations cannot uproot the 
psychological prejudices that drive phenotypic discrimination. The nature of phenotypic 
prejudice is too complex to be captured under the auspices of the law alone. However, 
we can appeal to the spirit o f privacy and augment attempts to eliminate phenotypic 
prejudice with more discerning ethical arguments. In doing so, the concept of privacy 
proves useful in combating both genotypic and phenotypic discrimination.
The spirit of phenotypic privacy may thus be best understood as an ethical 
imperative and not merely as a legal imperative. Justice Douglas seemed to have grasped 
this point in his majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. In establishing privacy as 
the protector of our fundamental liberties, he appealed to the spirit of the Constitution, a 
document infused with ethical imperatives. We must carry forth the spirit of privacy to 
areas beyond the reach of formalized law. We must address the most subtle phenotypic 
discrimination that occurs in our daily interactions.
The ethical problem of genetic discrimination is not so much that we treat people 
differently, but that we see people as their genes. It is the reduction of persons to their
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constituent genetic material that reinforces and legitimates the unequal treatment of 
persons. There is a belief that the biological nature of genes justifies differential 
treatment because it is somehow ‘natural,’ But differential treatment is not justified by 
the diversity found amongst human genomes. Since there is no one genome that can be 
considered ‘normal’ and used as a standard, differential treatment necessarily 
incorporates value judgments as to which genes are &vorable and which genes are 
unfavorable. Our attack upon genetic discrimination must thus focus upon the value 
judgments that substantiate discriminatory actions.
The resolution of both genotypic and phenotypic discrimination is grounded in 
our view of persons. We must not see persons as their genes, rather we must see them as 
persons, complete with dignity and guaranteed the protection of their fundamental 
liberties. We must champion the rights of privacy, both in formal law and in spirit, that 
protect these liberties.
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Limitations of Morality in the Context of Prenatal Genetic Testing 
I. Introduction
A hallmark of contemporary life is the inordinate amount of information that is 
available on any subject. It seems natural that, in a deluge of morally relevant 
information, we react by distilling a set of principles or action guides. However, 
following Bernard Williams, I will argue that this tendency to search for a moral system 
that will provide unequivocal directives belies the inherent complexities of ethical issues. 
In this paper, I will attempt to explicate the thicket of moral issues that are raised by 
contemporary biomedical science as it inundates society with new information regarding 
prenatal genetic testing. This thicket can be divided into two branches: (1) issues that 
arise in the process of informing hopeful parents about the results of the prenatal test, and 
(2) issues that are implicated in the decisions of the parents in response to these results. 
Although attempts have been made to bring morality to bear upon prenatal testing, they 
have typically addressed only the former branch of the thicket. The latter branch, which 
largely contains the more complex and intractable issues, is left untended. I will thus 
argue that with respect to the issues implicit in the decisions of parents, our primaiy task 
should be to explicate the complexities of the moral dimensions of prenatal testing, not to 
establish a moral system to guide the decision. With a clear conception of the richness of 
the moral issues surrounding prenatal testing, the intractable problems will be rendered 
more manageable, and the deluge of information less distracting, 
n. A Thicket of Moral Issues
For parents who are at risk of conceiving a child with a harmful and debilitating 
disease, the information that is available through genetic testing can provide
-49-
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immeasurable peace of mind. If the results are negative, parents can be reassured that a 
particular disease that has tom at the rest of their family will not ravage the health o f their 
child. Even if  the results of the genetic test are positive, the parents can still benefit from 
this information. With advanced screening technologies like chorionic villus sampling, 
the genetic status of a fetus can often be determined within the first trimester of 
pregnancy, before strong emotional attachments tend to take hold. This gives the parents 
time to consider the import of the test results. They can discuss the quality of life that the 
child would have if brought to term, and they can determine how well situated they are to 
provide that life. This allows the parents to either choose to abort the fetus or to prepare, 
both emotionally and financially, for the birth o f their child (McCann).
But this scenario describes prenatal testing at its best. In actuality, there are many 
complicating factors which make gaining genetic information about one’s child not so 
serene and idyllic. There are many contingencies that complicate the decision. In 
choosing to have the tests, parents must be concerned about the welfare of the fetus. In 
the common prenatal test amniocentesis, a long needle is inserted into the abdomen of the 
mother to collect a sample o f the amniotic fluid, by which cells of the fetus can be 
isolated and tested. There is an increased risk, however, that the fetus will spontaneously 
abort from the procedure (McCann). Therefore, in order to justify the risk to the fetus, 
there should be a significant probability that the results o f the test would detect a 
particular disposition toward disease. A thorough family health history must thus be 
obtained to help determine the necessity of such testing.
The parents will not only have to consider the welfare of the fetus, but they must 
also consider the welfere of the mother. Although results from genetic tests can be
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
-51-
determined within the first trimester, as in the case of chorionic villus sampling, it is not 
always possible to do so. Anmiocentesis delays the availability of a diagnosis by almost 
two months (Veip et al. 614). As the results are received later in the pregnancy, the time 
available for understanding and discussing the uniqueness of the situation decreases. 
Accordingly, there is a smaller window of time to make the decision.
This window for decision making is constrained on one side by the technology of 
genetic screenings. Chorionic villus sampling is performed between 7-11 weeks of 
pregnancy, and amniocentesis between 15-17 weeks, each needing approximately 2 
weeks to receive the results. On the other side, the window is constrained by increased 
risk of harm to mother, increased emotional attachment to the fetus, and a recommended 
gestational limit o f24-28 weeks (Verp et al. 614). Because o f these factors, the option of 
abortion becomes a less viable option as the pregnancy proceeds. If abortion is to remain 
an option, the parents are then left with less time to reflect upon the various implications 
of their decision, and, consequently, have less time to make a decision based upon their 
considered j udgments.
This short window of time seems especially cramped when the nature of the 
decision is brought to light. The parents are essentially trying to determine if the harm of 
aborting the fetus is better than the harm of delivering a child who must live with a 
particular malady. O f course, the harm o f some maladies is clearly extensive, such as the 
case of anencephaly, in which the fetus develops without a brain. But there are some 
maladies, for example cystic fibrosis, for which treatment is available, and improving, 
such that life expectancy is up into the 20’s and 30’s. It seems reasonable to decide that
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the harm in delivering an anencephalous infant justifies the harm of abortion, but 
questions are raised in the case of cystic fibrosis. What sort o f life is worth living?
There are two sets of information that must be addressed if  parents are ever to 
make a decision that does not rest upon ignorance, bias, or pure chance. The first set is 
the factual considerations that go into making the decision, and the second set is the 
particularly moral considerations and consequences of their decision. I will briefly 
address the first set of factual information in prenatal decision-making, but will spend 
most of my analysis on the more intractable issues of the second set.
III. Role of Genetic Counselors
The primary role o f genetic counselors is to provide clients with accurate, up-to- 
date information about the facts pertinent to their situation. In a case where a fetus has 
been positively linked to the cystic fibrosis gene marker, the genetic counselor would 
explain various aspects of the disease to the parents. These might include the probability 
that the child would actually suffer from the disease, the range of severity of the disease, 
and the available treatment options for a child with cystic fibrosis. To the average lay 
person, the language of genetics and genetic screens may seem foreign. To speak in 
terms o f probability is to speak in a language that humans are notoriously inept at 
comprehending. It is because the results of genetic tests are largely undecipherable to the 
untrained person that the need for a skilled translator has arisen. Genetic counselors are 
persons trained in genetics, in the mechanics of laboratory testing, and in counseling. 
Their duty is to translate genetic information into terms that the client can understand. 
Thus, genetic counselors ensure that parents have all of the facts regarding the results, 
which gives them a basis from which they can begin to make a decision.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
-53-
Thus, with regard to the two sets of pertinent information, genetic counselors 
address the first set, the factual considerations. Any moral decision must reflect the facts 
of the situation. Without its attending facts, a moral decision is blind in its prescription. 
The factual information that is supplied by genetic counselors provides the necessary 
conditions that will help the parents determine which options are real options. Thus, 
genetic counselors have a role-related duty to provide their clients with the basic factual 
information.
It does not follow, however, that the presentation of facts is the counselor’s only 
duty. As a profession, genetic counseling prides itself upon respect for the client’s 
autonomy. It aspires to be value-neutral in its presentation of the facts, and allows the 
client the fteedom to evaluate the situation according to his or her own values. Given the 
past practices of sterilization campaigns and extreme paternalism by physicians/ this 
separation between facts and values has valid historical reasons for its justification. 
However, strong arguments have recently been raised that this separation is no longer 
tenable,^ and that genetic counselors should take a more active role in providing moral 
guidance.^ If indeed it is true that genetic counselors must involve themselves in the 
evaluation of the facts as part of their presentation to their clients, then it would seem that 
genetic counselors also have a role-related responsibility to facilitate an understanding of 
the ethical dimensions of the situation.
‘ For a more in depth discussion of the values and practices in the history of genetic counseling, see James 
Sorenson.
* See Dan Brock.
 ̂See Karen Grandstrand Gervais. It should be noted that she does not call for a return to a paternalistic 
approach to genetic counseling. Rather, Gervais is directive in that she calls upon genetic counselors to 
encourage clients to consider the full range of issues.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
-54-
There have been two notable attempts to bring morality to bear upon the issues 
raised by genetic testing/ both originating in the autonomy of persons. Thus, the focus 
of these moral systems is upon the duties of the genetic counselor to respect the beliefs 
and decisions of the client regardless o f their content. They focus their attention upon 
resolving quandaries involving confidentiality or whether or not to inform clients about 
false paternity. In these limited respects, both moral systems do an adequate job of 
resolving the dilemmas.^ But to the extent that they attempt to capture the ethical 
dimensions of prenatal testing, they simply ignore the more intractable issues that arise.
IV. Overzealous Pruning
In his book. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bernard Williams chastises a 
modem conception of morality that attempts to distill the ethical life into a simple 
principle or system. Williams’s “morality” is characterized by a relentless semeh for an 
“Archimedean Point,” a foundation from which all moral issues might be uniquely 
resolved. But past attempts to find such a point either in well-being (Aristotle) or 
practical reason (Kant) have both failed. Since such a foundation cannot be found, at 
least in any powerful way, attempts to do so are not mere folly. They actually harm the 
ethical enterprise by diverting its attention away from the richness o f the ethical life and 
restricting its scope. We should, then, commit ourselves to the messiness o f ethical life, 
and work to explicate and understand the issues that face us.
In order to bring prenatal testing under a principled morality, it was necessary to 
consider one aspect of the ethical milieu -  that of genetic counseling. But by confining
* See Bernard Gert et al. and Beauchamp and Childress.
 ̂However, I do concede that with respect to resolving bioethical dilemmas, Gert’s system of moral 
analysis presents a more reasonable and consistent method than the checklist of principles of Beauchamp 
and Childress.
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the ethical scope of genetic testing to the responsibilities o f genetic counselors, principled 
moral systems ultimately fail to grasp the rich complexity of ethical issues that attend 
prenatal testing. To illustrate how the search for universal principles restricts ethical 
inquiry, let us take a closer look at Bernard Gert’s method of moral analysis.
In analyzing the moral issues surrounding genetic testing, Gert ultimately finds 
his foundation in the Kantian idea of a rational and impartial agent. Gert then distills 
from the ethical life a primary motivation—the avoidance of harm. Given the rational and 
impartial nature of humans and their motivation to avoid harm, a set of moral rules can be 
established. According to Gert, all rational and impartial agents would agree to this set of 
moral rules for the foundation of a moral system. An appeal for the legitimacy o f the 
system is grounded in the universal consensus o f the moral rules. Once he has 
established the moral rules as a public product, Gert has a code of conduct to which all 
rational and impartial agents could agree.^
At its foundation, Gert’s moral system appeals to impartial principles to determine 
which actions are prohibited, given the universal motivation to avoid harm. Although 
there may be some question as to whether or not the avoidance of harm is our primaiy 
motivation, a more damning criticism of Gert’s system is that which Williams raises 
against all systems based upon a Kantian notion of impartiality. Williams contests the 
idea that when we are deliberating a moral dilemma, we can extract ourselves from the 
situation and arrive at impartial principles. While it may be possible to distance 
ourselves from the situation through reflection, it does not explain how the impartial
® Although Gert’s system is more complex than my cursory sketch portrays, complete with justifications for 
violations of the moral rules and an additional analysis of moral ideals, it ultimately relies upon the basic 
foundation that I have described.
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principles are achieved. When we extract ourselves from our particular situations, we do 
not become detached selves, merging into an impartial, communal self. We remain the 
selves that are doing the extracting. Therefore, a l th o i^  we can say that it is reasonable 
to accept the moral rules for oneself, we cannot say that it is reasonable for others to 
accept them (Williams 61), which is essential for Gert’s moral system. The only way we 
can arrive at these impartial principles together is if we are already committed to them. 
The foundation of Gert’s moral system, like all moral foundations, is thus an illusion.
However, according to Williams, the folly of pursuing philosophical mirages is 
not without its costs. It is a harmful distraction from the more important process of 
coming to understand the issues that attend the ethical life. By focusing upon the 
responsibilities of genetic counselors to the exclusion of the clients, Gert and other moral 
systematists oversimplify the problems that face us and underestimate the complexity of 
the moral decisions that must be made. The ethical issues that attend prenatal testing 
cannot be restricted to those that surround the translation of facts and probabilities. The 
moral issues extend beyond the conveyance of factual information.
V. A Thickening of the Thicket
A full exploration into the ethical issues surrounding prenatal testing must address 
the decisions that are being made by the parents, and consider the various parties who are 
implicated in the decision-making process. I will address three such parties: the 
biomedical community, society, and the parents. With the addition of each interested 
party, the complexity of the ethical dimensions o f prenatal testing multiplies, until the 
decision of whether to abort or not challenges the limits of traditional morality.
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The first group that is implicated in the decision of the parents is the biomedical 
community. We have seen that in order for parents to be able to make a decision that is 
not based upon ignorance, bias, or chance, they need to be aware of the facts of the 
situation. However, the parents must also be able to evaluate these facts. In order to do 
this, parents need to make judgments concerning the definition of terms like ‘disease’ and 
‘severe.’ Although all parents have some thin idea o f what these terms mean, the 
decisions that they will make depend upon thorough conceptions of these terms. Parents 
must be able to determine that anencephaly is a  severe disease,’ and that this severe 
disease would cause more harm if  the pregnancy was continued than if it were to be 
terminated.
Since one of the problems parents must overcome is this lack of clear conceptions 
of ‘disease’ and ‘severe,’ they will often look to the biomedical professionals to fill out 
these terms. But the biomedical communily is hardly more prepared to substantively 
define these ternis than parents. In medicine, disease is sometimes defined as any 
condition that threatens the health of an individual, or deviates from a healthy 
individual’s normal functioning.^ But health’ is no more explicit a term than ‘disease’; 
in fact, it is the key concept that needs clarification in order to determine the right course 
of action in prenatal testing situations. In order to know what terms like ‘disease’ and 
‘severe’ are, we must first have some idea of the core concept of ‘health. ’ If the 
professionals of the biomedical community, like genetic counselors, either cannot provide 
these substantive definitions or will not provide them because of the evaluative content of 
such definitions, then parents are left isolated and must resort to ad hoc reasoning.
 ̂For a discussion of the definition o f‘health’ based upon organ function, see Boorse 1987.
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Here, we must at least consider the possibility of parents having questionable 
intentions for aborting a fetus. It is reasonable to assume that all parents desire a 
perfectly healthy child. But a cultural tendency to expect nothing less than a perfect child 
may result when the vagueness of what constitutes a ‘healthy child’ is combii^d with the 
power to know if one has a ‘diseased child.’ Consider the example of chromosomal 
trisomy 47, XXY. The fetus carries an extra sex chromosome, which might legitimately 
be considered a disease in that it causes a deviation from normal functioning. Although 
the infant will most likely be phenotypically normal and perhaps taller as an adult, the 
child will likely have a low IQ, characteristically leading to difficulty in school and in 
psychosocial development. Parents are additionally informed that this difficulty in 
psychosocial development correlates with ten times the chances of the child being 
incarcerated as an adult (Verp et al. 615). Why should parents accept these 
circumstances when there are other opportunities for creating a more perfect child?
When the evaluative terms used by the biomedical community are left to be applied by 
parents, some eugenic trends might begin to creep into the decision to abort, even in 
cases where the genetic anomalies are not generally considered ‘severe,’ as we will soon 
see.
It may be argued that even if these eugenic trends were being established, it is for 
the parents to determine whether the affected fetus is brought to term. But this argument 
belies an assumption which implicates the society’s interests in the parents’ decision­
making process. This argument assumes that the decision is uniquely the parents’ 
concern, i.e. the choice to abort a fetus rests solely in the hands of the parents, 
specifically in the hands of the woman in the legal tradition. Yet, as the example of
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parental decision making in the case of sex chromosome anomalies suggests, there is a 
peculiar, yet compelling, societal concern which arises in the context of genetic testing.
If such a societal concern can be legitimized, the richness of the issues pertinent to the 
decision reaches a further level of complexity, one that challenges the sovereignty of 
individual autonomy.
To say that the right of parents to choose an abortion extends to the decisions 
regarding genetic testing is to confuse the abortion of a fetus with the abortion of a 
particular fetus because of certain characteristics. By aborting a particular fetus with trait 
X, one is saying that trait X is negative enough to overshadow other considerations that 
might require our respect, i.e. the parents would want the fetus to continue development 
if it did not have trait X. Although it might be argued that this judgment is strictly a 
private decision that has no effect upon anyone other than the family, it might also be 
argued that the effects of this judgment may very well extend beyond the parents in at 
least two important ways.
In part of a study by Verp et al. in 1988, parents chose to abort fetuses with 
autosomal aneuploidies (more or less than 2 copies o f a chromosome) in 87.5% of cases 
recorded. The study followed parents’ decisions for three types of aneuploidies: 
trisomies 13,18, and 21. Although each disease has its unique manifestations, all three 
diseases share similar prognoses of severe mental retardation and shortened life spans. In 
these cases, there is no clear directive concerning the decision to abort. Persuasive 
arguments can be made both in favor of and in opposition to abortion, depending upon 
the way in which the substantive concept of ‘severe’ is understood. Because of this 
indeterminacy, the moral consequences for society are hard to discern, except the
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utilitarian concerns, which I reject, of the economic burden such individuals place upon 
society.
We can escape this indeterminacy and make the interests of society more easily 
visible if  we consider the results of the second part o f the same study. In the case of sex 
chromosome anomalies, parents chose to abort affected fetuses 41.2% o f the time (Verp 
et al. 616). Although this study looked at four different aneuploidy arrangements in the 
sex chromosomes, they all share much less severe disease symptoms. Each arrangement 
in sex chromosomes ex^wesses itself differently, but in general, these individuals look 
normal, have slight drops in average IQ, slight increases m psychosocial difficulties, may 
be infertile, and pertiaps need hormonal treatments in adolescence. There is no decrease 
in life expectancy or clear indications of a painful life.
By aborting these fetuses in 41.2% of the cases, these parents have, in effect, 
stated that a s li^ t  decrease in IQ and psychosocial adjustment, infertility, and hormonal 
treatments cumulatively make a life unwordiy of the trouble. Here, the societal concern 
is apparent when you consider those individuals in society who have these chromosomal 
arrangements, and who are living fulfilling and worthwhile lives. Is the abortion of an 
otherwise desired fetus because o f ‘minor’ genetic anomalies an attack upon the lives of 
persons in society who have these same genetic anomalies? Is the decision to abort a 
fetus because it has the female arrangement of sex chromosomes (XX) an attack upon 
women in society? I do not intend to address these highly charged questions in this 
paper. I will leave these questions open for further exploration. These are used only to 
point out that the decision o f the parents may extend to the concerns of others in society.
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and to demonstrate the level of complexity which ethical issues in genetic testing 
achieves.
Society has a real interest in protecting the dignity of its individual members from 
discrimination. It may be concluded that selective abortion violates a person’s dignity, 
and thus extends beyond the interests of the parents in two ways. First, society may have 
an interest in extending its protection to include the protection of friture persons against 
discrimination. Thus, society would have an interest in prohibiting abortion only in cases 
of selective abortion in which the act is discriminating against future persons based upon 
genetic criteria. Second, it could be determined that discriminating actions against 
fetuses based upon certain genes also discriminates against persons Wio share those 
genes. If either of these societal interests can be substantiated, then the autonomy of 
parents to abort a fetus for particular reasons raises a host of issues to consider. But the 
more important point for this paper is that these are questions that cannot go unanswered.
Ultimately, the decision to abort remains with the parents. Although they must 
consider the impact of their decision upon others, it is largely the psychological and 
financial burden of the parents to bear and raise the child. Therefore, the final decision 
rests with the parents and relies upon their judgment. We have seen that the decisions 
parents must make are complicated both by the vagueness of concepts like ‘disease’ and 
severe’, and by societal considerations. But there is another consideration that parents 
must face, which will further add richness to this issue: parents must wrestle with their 
fear of contingency.
The contingency aspect of moral decision making in the context of prenatal 
testing can perhaps best be illuminated through an understanding of the conflicting
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desires of the concerned parents. On one side, the parents want a child, often any child. 
They would embrace the birth of a little girl or little boy. They would equally embrace a 
baby with curiy locks of hair or silky tufts of fuzz, sparkling blue eyes or deep brown 
ones. All of these genetic traits would be equally endearing, and in some senses, the 
surprise following the awareness of these traits is the beauty of contingency in childbirth. 
But on the other side, parents want a ‘healthy’ child. There are some contingencies that 
parents fear, such as their child inheriting a debilitating disease. The contingencies of 
childbirth thus strike both awe and fear into the hearts o f parents.
However, with the availability of prenatal genetic information through testing, 
parents can now separate these conflicting aspects o f contingency and prevent their child 
from expressing a particular genetic disease. Although any life is full of things that occur 
randomly and out of one’s control, ^enatal genetic testing can offer a small, yet 
powerfiil, respite from some of the fearful contingencies of childbirth. With a few 
genetically identifiable diseases, parents can circumvent the contingency of inheriting a 
genetic malady, and determine the relative health of their child in this respect.
Although in some ways, this can be a wonderful new means to prevent the 
suffering of both parents and children, there are two points that must be kept in mind with 
regard to the power to overcome contingency. First, we must remember that some 
contingencies in genetics will always remain. We may be able to control certain aspects 
of genetics, but other aspects will remain indeterminate. Only the most straightforward 
o f genetic diseases are detectable, or have any hope of being detectable with precision.
At one level, the interactions between genes responsible for complex diseases are hard to 
discern. And at another level, the interactions between genes and the environment
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exacerbate the complexities of multiple gene interactions, ensuring some large areas of 
indeterminacy. If we quixotically attempt to overextend our limited mastery over the 
contingencies of childbirth, we are surely to be disappointed. And it will not be us, but 
rather our children, who embody some of the inevitable contingencies of procreation, 
who will bear the brunt of our disillusionment.
The second consideration with regard to contingency is its inverse relationship 
with responsibility. We tend to judge a person’s moral decisions more generously if the 
person is acting in response to contingencies, as opposed to situations in which they have 
helped determine the circumstances. Consider the example of a boy who helped a kitten 
down from a high tree branch. If the boy merely noticed the kitten on the branch, and 
acted to bring the kitten down, we would morally applaud the boy. Had he not acted to 
save the kitten, we would refrain from applauding him, but would tend not to make a 
moral judgment against him. However, if  the circumstances were different such that the 
kitten in the tree is not a contingent fact for the boy, let us say that he chased the kitten up 
the tree, then an absence of action to help get the kitten down would be morally 
deplorable. From this simple example, it is evident that the more we determine the 
circumstances of a situation, the more moral responsibility we have over the outcome of 
the situation. As we consider the possibility of determining certain aspects of childbirth, 
we must remember this relationship with responsibility.
We thus seemingly arrive at a paradox. Fetal genetic information made available 
by prenatal testing seems to demand more from the parents who receive a positive 
diagnosis than can reasonably be expected from them. Within a small window of time, 
parents must not only come to understand the factual considerations of their situation.
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they must also come to appreciate the moral consi<krations I have described above. And 
while the ability to comprehend these moral dimensions reach heroic proportions at the 
level of the individual, we have seen that the parents are increasingly more responsible 
for the outcome of their decision.
Consider a set of parents who learns that there is an 80% chance that their child 
will not express the disease cystic fibrosis. They figure that the chances are pretty good 
that their child will not express this disease. However, soon after the birth, it is 
determined that the child does have a particularly severe form of cystic fibrosis. The 
20% chance of the child expressing the disease actually occurred. The child spends the 
next 6 years of her life in and out of the hospital, suffering from the complications of 
cystic fibrosis before death finally ends her suffering. Did the parents make a mistake? 
Are they responsible for the suffering of their daughter?
The answer to this paradox lies in its dissolution. To place the blame squarely on 
the shoulders of the parents is to mistakenly believe that the decision is uniquely the 
decision of the parents. As I have attempted to demonstrate, although the ultimate 
decision rests with the parents, the parents are not moral actors independent of society. 
The biomedical community gives the parents their concepts of probability and ‘disease’ 
upon which the parents must make their decision. And society in general can promote an 
over-confidence in mastering the contingencies of childbirth. Just as society shares an 
interest in the decisions of parents, so does society share responsibility for their results. 
The paradox dissolves as we reintegrate society into the picture. Although the 
complications that parents must consider are too much for isolated individuals, they are 
not too much for a collective body of individuals.
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VI. A Call to Landscape Thickets into Trimmed Hedges
Throughout this paper, I have attempted to present a picture o f the complexities 
that arise with increased genetic information in the context of prenatal testing. I have 
largely raised more questions than I have answered, but at this stage, we must be 
concerned with the scope of the problem before we move too quickly for solutions. 
Following Williams, I have resisted the temptation of bringing these issues immediately 
under a moral system of principles. Instead, I have attempted to explicate some of the 
more intractable problems that undergird the issues surrounding prenatal genetic testing. 
At some point, we must turn our attention to the resolution of these complex problems, 
but this deserves the attention of separate papers. Thus, I will end by merely proposing a 
starting point for a sustained discussion o f how these issues might be resolved.
We have seen how both individual parents and society at large have interests in 
the issues that arise in the context of prenatal genetic testing. We should begin our 
discussion with this core understanding. Once we admit this, we can address the various 
complications that make these issues so difficult. As individuals always in relation to 
society, we must define substantive concepts like ‘severe disease’ and ‘quality of life.’
We must fill out these concepts with our collective experiences. Likewise, the proper 
role of contingency in our lives must also be fully explored. How much contingency do 
we want in our lives? Answering these questions up front as a collective group will 
mitigate against the pressures placed upon the individual when he or she must decide as 
an individual.
The most pressing concern that we face in contemporary life is the organization of 
the influx of information of all kinds. As individuals, we have little hope of sorting
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through this mountain of information and making responsible decisions based upon 
careful consideration of the issues involved. But as a collective whole, there is hope: 
hope to organize the information about the world, hope to understand our world, and 
hope to guide the world by the common values that we hold.
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